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Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings
Product in the Philippines
Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin
Abstract
Female “empowerment” has increasingly become a policy goal, both as an end to itself and as a
means to achieving other development goals. Microfinance in particular has often been argued,
but not without controversy, to be a tool for empowering women. Here, using a randomized
controlled trial, we examine whether access to an individually-held commitment savings product
leads to an increase in female decision-making power within the household. We find positive
impacts, particularly for women who have below median decision-making power in the baseline,
and we find this leads to a shift towards female-oriented durables goods purchased in the
household.
JEL Codes: D12, D63, D91, J16, O12, O16





Female “empowerment” has increasingly become a policy goal, both as an end to itself and as a 
means to achieving other development goals.1  A growing literature on intra-household 
bargaining finds that exogenous increases in female share of income, interpreted as providing the 
female more power in the household, lead to an allocation of resources that better reflect 
preferences of the woman (Duflo 2003; Rangel 2005).  This often leads to greater investment in 
education, housing, and nutrition for children (Thomas 1990; 1994; 1995; Duflo 2003).  Many 
development interventions have thus focused on transferring income as a way of inducing 
empowerment.   
 However, it is not clear in theory that transfers of income alone to women can improve their 
status in the household.  Marginal increases in income given to women may be bargained over in 
the same way as existing income, and are therefore not guaranteed to lead to gains in bargaining 
power.  What may be important is providing access to additional sources of income flows, and 
giving control and property rights over allocated money.2  One could increase power directly by 
providing unilateral access to a financial service, such as a loan or a savings account. Indeed, 
microfinance proponents often argue that these empowerment mechanisms justifies increased 
attention and financing to microfinance institutions, and perhaps even subsidies (Hashemi, 
Schuler and Riley 1996; Kabeer 1999).  There is, however, little rigorous evidence that 
interventions that focus on power directly actually can promote female empowerment.  Nor have 
we been able to assess the consequences of such induced (rather than “naturally” encountered) 
empowerment.  This study contributes to this literature by exogenously creating a financial asset 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Engendering Development (World Bank 2001).  By “female empowerment” we mean 
increasing the bargaining power of the woman within the household, manifested through increased 
influence in household decisions and through household outcomes that greater reflect her preferences. 
2 Anderson and Eswaran (2005) find that income needs to be in the control of women- not just generated by 
them- in order to impact their bargaining power in the household.  The relevant threat point in their context, 
as in ours where divorce is uncommon, is non-cooperative behavior.  
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to which one and only one person has legal control, and measuring its impact on both decision 
making power and household outcomes.3 
 We designed and implemented a commitment savings product with the Green Bank of 
Caraga, a rural bank in the Philippines.  Current bank clients were randomly chosen to receive an 
offer to open an additional “commitment” account in their own name.  Of course, commitment 
devices for savings could benefit those with self-control as well as familial or spousal control 
issues.  The literature on household savings, and on informal savings devices in particular, has 
focused on separating self-control motivations and impacts from spousal or familial-control 
explanations (Anderson and Baland 2002; Gugerty 2006).  However, such devices can serve both 
purposes.  Indeed, we find compelling evidence for both motives.    
  The savings product provided individuals with a commitment to restrict access to their 
savings.  Each individual defined either a “date” goal or an “amount” goal, and was then not able 
to withdraw their funds until the goal was reached.  We reported earlier (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 
2006) that after one year individuals who were offered the product increased their savings by 
81% relative to a control group, and that in accordance with the theoretical literature on 
hyperbolic preferences (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999) and dual-self models (Gul 
and Pesendorfer 2001; 2004; Fudenberg and Levine 2005), time-inconsistent individuals were the 
ones most likely to demonstrate a preference for this commitment. 
 Using two new sources of data, a follow-up survey collected after one year and administrative 
bank data collected after two and a half years, we examine here the impact of this commitment 
savings product on both self-reported decision making processes within the household and the 
subsequent household allocation of resources.  The product caused an increase in household 
                                                 
3 A commitment savings account could generate differences in household outcomes not because of the 
“legal” control built in to the product, but merely because it establishes a norm within the household that 
the funds are for certain purposes, and this norm is not then unwound by ex-post reallocation of resources.  
This is much akin to the findings in Duflo and Udry (2003) in which crop revenue in Cote d’Ivoire is 
labeled as either male, female, or family, and shocks to one “mental account” remain in that account and 
are not reallocated fully ex-post. 
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decision making power for married women, measured both in the women’s own reporting of how 
household decisions were made and in the household’s purchases of goods typically used by 
women.  Notably, the effect on decision making power is strongest for married women who had 
below-median household decision making power prior to the intervention.  The effect is found for 
four categories of decisions: expenditures on large purchases, personal items, assisting family 
members, and number of children.  We also find that households in which a woman was offered 
the commitment product were more likely to buy durables typically used by women within the 
household.  We find no such effects on household durables when a man was offered the 
commitment savings account. 
 We also find an impact on self-perception of savings behavior.  Note that in earlier work we 
found that time-inconsistent women (as measured through time preference questions in a baseline 
survey) were more likely to open the commitment savings account than time consistent women.  
Here we find that for time-inconsistent women, the commitment savings account made them 
more likely to perceive themselves as a disciplined saver and to report saving available cash 
rather than spending it.  Thus, evidence exists to show that the commitment device had an impact 
on both spousal control and (at least the self-perception of) self-control.    
 We also examine whether any increase in savings held by the individual in this account 
reduced the overall savings held by the household.  Although we cannot distinguish between the 
individual crowding out his or her own savings elsewhere versus the spouse saving less, we can 
test whether the commitment device overall leads to higher aggregate household savings. 4  This 
is an important policy question in general regarding illiquid savings, not just relevant to an 
understanding household bargaining (Feldstein 1974; 1982; 1996).  Furthermore, existing 
evidence on commitment devices focuses mostly on the impact on savings in the commitment 
                                                 
4 Indeed, commitment savings devices are thought to increase savings for present-biased discounters 
(Laibson 1997).   
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device itself (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (2004) and Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006)).5  We find that 
increases in institutional savings resulting from the commitment product offering do not crowd 
out other savings in the household, regardless of who controls the other asset.  Thus, the savings 
put into the commitment product did not appear to reduce the savings controlled by other 
household members: rather, it was likely a result of an overall reduction in and shifting of 
consumption in the household.   
  This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the commitment savings product and 
the experimental design.  Section III presents the empirical results on household decision making 
and self-perception of savings behavior.  Section IV presents the empirical results on crowd-out 
of other savings in order to examine whether the increase was a shift from other member’s 
savings.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Intervention and Experimental Design 
The SEED Account 
We designed and implemented a commitment savings product called a SEED (Save, Earn, 
Enjoy Deposits) account with the Green Bank of Caraga, a small rural bank in Mindanao, 
Philippines.  The SEED account requires that clients commit not to withdraw funds that are in the 
account until they reach a goal date or amount but does not explicitly commit the client to deposit 
funds after opening the account.  The SEED accounts are individual accounts, even if the 
participants were married.  There are three critical design features to the account, one regarding 
withdrawals and two regarding deposits.  First, individuals restricted their rights to withdraw 
funds until they reached a specific goal.  Clients could restrict withdrawals until a specified 
                                                 
5 The latter study shows that institutional savings increase in response to a randomized offering of a 
commitment savings account.  However, neither study is able to assess whether savings increases are 
accompanied by contemporaneous crowd-out of savings held in physical assets, savings at other formal or 
informal institutions, or accompanied by negative savings as represented by increased debt.  Similar crowd-
out questions remain unanswered in other interventions which increase savings held in specific accounts 
(Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag and Saez 2006). 
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month when large expenditures were expected, e.g. the beginning of school, Christmas, a 
particular celebration, or when business needs arose.  Alternatively, clients could set a goal 
amount and only have access to the funds once that goal was reached (e.g., saving a quantity of 
money known to be needed for a new roof).  The clients had complete flexibility to choose which 
of these restrictions they would like on their account. Once the client had made the decision they 
could neither change it, nor could they withdraw from the account until they met their chosen 
goal amount or date.6 After the goal is reached, the SEED client, not his or her spouse, could 
withdraw the funds.  All clients, regardless of the type of restriction they chose, were encouraged 
to set a specific savings goal as the purpose of their SEED savings account.  SEED marketers 
insisted that the client herself or himself, and not another household member, set the goal.7 
The savings goal was written on the SEED form used to open the account, as well as on a 
“Commitment Savings Certificate” that was given to the client to keep.  Forty-eight percent of 
clients reported wanting to save for a celebration, such as Christmas, birthday or fiesta.8  Twenty-
one percent of clients chose to save for tuition and education expenses, while 20 percent of clients 
chose business and home investments as their specific goals. 
The bank offered each client a locked box (called a “ganansiya” box) for a small fee in order 
to encourage deposits.  This locked box is similar to a piggy bank: it has a small opening to 
deposit money and a lock to prevent the client from opening it.  In our setup, only the bank, and 
                                                 
6Exceptions are allowed for medical emergency, in which case a hospital bill is required, for death in the 
family, requiring a death certificate, or relocating outside the bank’s geographic area, requiring 
documentation from the area government official.  The clients who signed up for the SEED product signed 
a contract with the bank agreeing to these strict requirements.  After six months of the project, no instances 
occurred of someone exercising these options.  For the amount-based goals, the money remains in the 
account until either the goal is reached or the funds withdrawn or the funds are requested under an 
emergency. 
7 SEED marketers reported instances of household visits in which the husband tried to influence the goal-
setting process.  Typically the marketers then asked that only the wife to give her goal and this was 
recorded, but at no point did the marketer make an issue out of the goal setting process.  Green Bank 
prohibits spouses from being able to withdraw from each others’ accounts, unless the account was 
explicitly opened as a joint account.  No SEED accounts were opened as joint accounts.  
8Fiestas are large local celebrations that happen at different dates during the year for each barangay 
(smallest political unit & defined community, on average containing 1000 individuals) in this region.  
Families are expected to host large parties, with substantial food, when it is their barangay’s fiesta date.  
Families often pay for this annual party through loans from local high-interest-rate money-lenders. 
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not the client, had a key to open the lock.  Thus, in order to make a deposit, clients need to bring 
the box to the bank periodically.  Out of the 202 clients who opened accounts, 167 opted for this 
box.  This feature can be thought of as a mental account with a small, physical barrier; the box is 
merely a mechanism that provides individuals a way to save their small change.  Individuals put 
loose change or small bills on a daily basis, hence making “deposits” that normally would be too 
small to warrant a trip to the bank.  These small daily “deposits” keep cash out of one’s (and 
others’) pocket; eventually, once enough money accumulates in the box, the client deposits the 
funds at the bank.  The barrier, however, is largely psychological; the box is easy to break and 
hence is a weak physical commitment at best.9 
Other than providing a possible commitment savings device, no further benefit accrued to 
individuals with this account.  The interest rate paid on the SEED account was identical to the 
interest paid on a normal savings account (4 percent per annum). 
The Experimental Design and Data Collection 
Our sample for the field experiment consists of 4001 adult Green Bank clients who have 
savings accounts in one of two bank branches in the greater Butuan City area, and who have 
identifiable addresses.  We randomly chose 3125 out of 4001 bank clients to interview for our 
baseline survey.  We then performed a second randomization to assign these individuals to three 
groups: commitment-treatment (T), marketing-treatment (M), and control (C) groups.  One-half 
the sample was randomly assigned to T, and a quarter of the sample each were randomly assigned 
to groups M and C.  We verified at the time of the randomization that the three groups were not 
statistically different in terms of preexisting financial and demographic data.  Of the 3125, 1776 
were located by the survey team and then completed a survey.  See Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 
                                                 
9 To facilitate deposits, clients also were offered automatic transfers from a primary checking or savings 
account into the SEED account.  This feature was not popular.  Many clients reported not using their 
checking or savings account regularly enough for this option to be meaningful.  Even though preliminary 
focus groups indicated demand for this feature, only 2 out of the 202 clients opted for automated transfers. 
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(2006) for analysis that shows that the treatment and control groups were observably statistically 
similar at the time of the baseline. 
Next, we trained a team of marketers hired by the partnering bank to go to the homes and/or 
businesses of the clients in the commitment-treatment group, to stress the importance of savings 
to them – a process which included eliciting the clients’ motivations for savings and emphasizing 
to the client that even small amounts of saving make a difference – and then to offer them the 
SEED product.  We were concerned, however, that this special (and unusual) face-to-face visit 
might in and of itself inspire higher savings.  To address this concern, we created a second 
treatment, the “marketing” treatment.  We used the same exact script for both the commitment-
treatment group and the marketing-treatment group, up to the point when the client was offered 
the SEED savings account.  For instance, members of both groups were asked to set specific 
savings goals for themselves, write those savings goals into a specific “encouragement” savings 
certificate, and talk with the marketers about how to reach those goals.  However, members of the 
marketing-treatment group were neither offered nor allowed to open the SEED account.  Bank 
staff were trained to refuse SEED accounts to members of the marketing-treatment and control 
groups, and to offer a “lottery” explanation: clients were chosen at random through a lottery for a 
special trial period of the product, after which time it would be available for all bank clients.  
Green Bank reported that this happened on fewer than ten occurrences.10 
After one year, we conducted a follow-up survey on each of the participants.  The tracking 
rate was high: 92% of those in the baseline were tracked and agreed to a second survey.  Those in 
the treatment group were equally likely to complete a follow-up survey as those in the marketing 
or control group.  This survey contained three sections: (1) inventory of assets, in order to 
measure whether the impact on savings represented a net increase in savings or merely a crowd-
                                                 
10In only one instance an individual in the control group opened a SEED account.  This individual is a 
family member of the owners of the bank and hence was erroneously included in the sample frame.  Due to 
the family relationship, the individual was dropped from all analysis. 
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out of other assets; (2) impact on household decision making and savings attitudes; and (3) 
impact on economic decisions, such as purchase of durable goods, health and consumption. 
 
III. Impact on Household Decision Making and Self-Perception of Savings Behavior 
 Household Decision Making Power 
We first examine whether being offered the SEED account changed the decision making roles 
in the household.  In the follow-up survey, we ask questions regarding family planning, financial 
and consumption decisions in order to ascertain the structure of spousal or familial control within 
married households.  For each decision category, we record whether the principle decision-maker 
is the respondent, the spouse, or both.  Responses are assigned values of two, zero and one, 
respectively.  We construct two decision making indices from the nine categories: (1) equally-
weighted mean of each response given, and (2) a linear combination, determined through a factor 
analysis, of the individual responses to each question (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2003).  The 
nine categories are decisions on what to buy at the market, expensive purchases, giving assistance 
to family members, family purchases, recreational use of the money, personal use of the money, 
number of children, schooling of children, and use of family planning. 11 
Table 2, Panel B shows the impact of treatment assignment on household decision making for 
married women, as measured by the two indices mentioned above.12  We find that assignment to 
the treatment group leads to a 0.14 standard deviation increase in the first (equally-weighted) 
decision making index (Table 2, Panel B, Column 1), and a 0.25 standard deviation increase in 
                                                 
11 See Pitt, Khandker and Cartwight (2003) for a discussion of alternative constructions of a household 
decision making index.  Our results are robust to summing across the measures, and to specifications that 
measure changes, rather than controlling for baseline levels as we report in the text.  Furthermore, since the 
factor analysis drops observations for which any answer is missing, we also examine the first measure of 
equal weights but omitting all observations for which any one answer is missing.  Results for the equally-
weighted mean index do not change on this smaller sample of individuals. 
12 This applies to married women whose spouses live at home with them.  53 out of 696 married women 
had no spouse in the house in both baseline and follow-up; 24 out of 541 married men had no spouse 
during both surveys.  These married individuals were not included in our analysis.  
 9
the second (factor-analysis) decision making index (Table 2, Panel B, Column 3).13  Next, we 
separately analyze the impact on women who began the year below (above) the median decision 
making power.  We find that the average effect is largely driven by increases in decision making 
ability for women who were below the baseline median (comparing Panels A and B in Table 2b) - 
a fact consistent with initially less-empowered women gaining decision making ability through 
increased financial savings and control over committed assets.  In contrast, we find no such 
treatment effect for married men (Table 2b, Panel A, Columns 5-8).  
Table 3 reports the impact for married women for each of the nine household decision 
categories that comprise the indices used in Table 2.  Panel A shows the results for the full 
sample.  We find impact on two decisions: expensive purchases and number of children.  For 
women below the median in terms of household decision making power (Panel B), we find a 
significant impact of treatment assignment regarding purchases of expensive items, decisions to 
assist family members and purchases of items for personal use.  For women above the baseline 
median (Panel C), the categories with significant treatment impacts are those beyond financial 
decision making: schooling for children and number of children.     
Next, we examine whether the increased reported decision making led to a difference in the 
types of goods purchased for the household.  By increasing the assets available for lumpy 
purchases, the mere presence of the SEED account may increase female decision-making power 
in the household and hence increase the likelihood that the household acquires female-oriented 
durables.  Naturally, if the account is held in the women’s name this effect should be even 
stronger.   
We use three categories for expenditures: house repair, female-oriented durables (washing 
machines, sewing machines, electric irons, kitchen appliances, air-conditioning units, fans and 
stoves), and other durables (vehicles/motorcycles, entertainment and recreational goods).  Table 4 
                                                 
13 The standard deviation shift is calculated by dividing the point estimates of 0.056 and 0.198 from Table 2 
by the standard deviations of each index for married women as found in Table 1.. 
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finds no significant impacts on the choice and/or quantity of durables purchased in the household 
in aggregate, nor broken down by gender.  Table 5 analyzes the same dependent variables, but 
separately for those above and below the median in terms of household decision making power at 
the baseline (similar to Table 3 Panel B and Panel C when analyzing the impact on specific 
decision-making power).  We find that both the number of items purchased and the total 
expenditures of consumer durables traditionally associated with female use in the Philippines 
increase for married women who were below the median in pre-existing bargaining power.  This 
effect is smaller, and not statistically significant, for married women above the median.  This 
finding is consistent with the impact on decision making ability for purchases of personal items 
and durable goods.  We do not, however, find that married households where the women are 
below the median in decision making ability increase expenditures on other non-female specific 
durables.  Likewise, we do not find any effect for men offered SEED, either in aggregate or for 
those above or below the median in household decision making power (Table 5, Panels C and D). 
Taken together, the presence of both direct impact on self-reported decision making 
measures, and a greater composition of female oriented durables, suggest that women who were 
offered the commitment savings product indeed increased their power within their household.  
Crowdout 
 Next we examine whether the increase in savings held alone by the participant led to a 
reduction in savings held jointly with their spouse.  Table 6 reports the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect 
of random assignment to the treatment group on several asset and financial savings categories as 
measured in the one-year follow-up survey, as well as the one-year administrative data (reported 
in an earlier paper) and new 32-month administrative data.   
 We first show the replication of our earlier results (Column 1) which demonstrate the simple 
effect of the treatment on savings held at the Green Bank one year after the treatment began.  
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Column 4 shows that these savings did not crowdout total household savings.14  Most importantly 
for this paper, Column 6 shows that these savings did not lead to a reduction in savings held by 
the participant in communal household savings accounts, or to a reduction in savings held by 
others in the household in their own accounts.  This final result however deserves a note of 
caution: we surveyed the respondents, not their household members.  Hence, we are only 
measuring savings of which they are aware.   
 Self-Perception of Savings Behavior 
 In the follow-up survey, we included several questions about personal savings habits and 
attitudes.  In earlier research we found that time-inconsistent women were more likely than time-
consistent women to take up the SEED product, but that no such differential was found for men.15  
Here we examine whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects on savings attitudes and 
practices for men versus women and time-inconsistent versus time-consistent clients.  Table 7 
presents the results on four outcomes using an ordered probit specification.  For each outcome, 
the respondent was asked whether they strongly agree, agree, are neutral, disagree or strongly 
disagree with a specific statement.  First, we ask about savings practices: (1) (Columns 1 and 2) 
“Although my income is low, I am a disciplined saver”, (2) (Columns 3 and 4) “I never save”, 
and (3) (Columns 5 and 6) “When I have a little cash, I spend it rather than save it.”  We find no 
aggregate effect, although we do find that time-inconsistent women who were offered the SEED 
account report being more likely to be a disciplined saver, less likely to never save, and less likely 
to report spending rather than saving extra cash.  This indicates that at least in their perception, 
                                                 
14 The large standard error may be due to unsystematic measurement error in self-reported savings levels, 
or to wide heterogeneity in the degree of savings crowd-out due to the treatment.   We lack institutional 
data for savings held at non-Green Bank institutions to compare self-reported savings to actual savings 
levels.  However, for Green Bank savings, we have both institutional data and self-reported savings.  We 
regress true institutional savings on self-reported savings, and find that the residuals of the regression are 
not predicted by assignment to treatment group.  Results are not shown, but available upon request.  
Therefore, the imprecision in the estimated impact on total household savings is likely the outcome of 
unsystematic measurement error in self-reported savings. 
15 Individuals defined as present-biased time-inconsistent when in hypothetical time preference questions in 
the survey, they revealed a higher discount rate for tradeoffs between now and 30 days than  tradeoffs 
between 6 months and 7 months. 
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the SEED account helped them overcome their self-control problem and led to improved savings 
practices (in earlier research, we do not find that the time-inconsistent women actually save more 
than the time-consistent women).   
 The final statement (Columns 7 and 8) is “I often find that I regret spending money.  I wish 
that when I had cash, I was better disciplined and saved it rather than spent it.”  Being assigned to 
treatment makes individuals more likely to report feeling regret over their spending and savings 
decisions.16  Note that only 28% of those offered SEED took up, and of those only about one-
third regularly used the account.17  Hence it follows that although SEED helped 10% of the 
treatment group save more (and generate an overall positive intent-to-treat effect), the mere offer 
of the SEED account generated, on average, a feeling of remorse.  Perhaps those who did not take 
up and use felt remorse, and those who did take up and use did not feel remorse, but the average 
effect is an increase in remorse because of the relative size of these two groups.  Perhaps a second 
marketing would have been more successful than the first, if the first offer made individuals more 
aware of their inability to save as much as they would like. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 Even when husbands appropriate their wives’ loans, microcredit is thought to empower 
women in household decision making processes (Mizan 1993).  Policymakers frequently cite 
these arguments as a key motivation for targeting microfinance and microsavings interventions to 
women.  On the other side, some have argued that microfinance usage and the subsequent need to 
repay (e.g., in order to protect her reputation amongst her peers) may subjugate women to the 
power of their spouses, hence potentially increasing domestic violence (Rahman 1999).  Evidence 
(albeit weak) points both ways, and naturally may depend largely on the region-specific economic 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, agreeing with this statement is also correlated with being time-inconsistent when answering 
hypothetical time preference questions. 
17 Appendix Table 1 shows that about half of the individuals who have not withdrawn their funds never 
actually used the account beyond the initial account opening deposit.. 
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and social setting.18  The effects of microcredit and, more generally, microfinance, which includes 
savings and/or insurance products, on female empowerment remain unclear, in large part because 
studies of it tend to suffer from a pronounced selection bias in the type of women who access 
microcredit (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2003).   
 Using a randomized controlled trial, we evaluate the impact of a commitment micro-savings 
account.  We find that the commitment product positively impacts both household decision 
making power for women (i.e., the household is more likely to buy female-oriented durables), 
self-perception of savings behavior (time-inconsistent females report being more disciplined 
savers), as well as actual consumption decisions regarding durables goods.  We also find no 
evidence that this is a result of crowd-out of other savings held at the same financial institution or 
elsewhere by either the individual or their spouse.   
 However, we do find that the strong (72%, as reported in Table 6, Column 1) impact on 
savings that was observed after 12 months diminishes to 32% after 32 months (Table 6, Column 
2) and is no longer statistically significant.  We posit several reasons for the diminished impact of 
the commitment product, which may have to do with the ease of undoing commitment over a 
longer-time period—either because one returns to one’s habit (if commitment is sought for self-
control reasons) or because one’s spouse finds ways of regaining control (if commitment is 
sought for spousal control reasons).  In other words, perhaps the SEED account caused a 
deviation from equilibrium (either in one’s own savings behavior or in the household dynamics), 
and gradually, individuals and households found ways to return back to the equilibrium they were 
in before.  There is some qualitative evidence that this type of pressure occurred for some of the 
women who were SEED clients.  For instance, from these qualitative interviews with SEED 
                                                 
18 Recent evidence from a randomized controlled trial in South Africa finds no impact from access to credit 
on household decision-making (Karlan and Zinman 2006).  See Chapter 7 of Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005) for more discussion on this. 
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clients, it appears that some women who desired the commitment feature of the SEED account 
had husbands who did not want to have any household funds tied up.19   
 There are other more superficial explanations: the Green Bank engaged in no activity 
whatsoever to promote continually the SEED account or encourage individuals to use the 
account.  If in each moment in time a client has a certain probability, less than one, of continuing 
to use the account, then clearly usage in aggregate will diminish over time.  Perhaps the product 
would have been more successful in the long run with continued marketing and promotion, by 
asking clients for an active decision to renew (Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick 2005), or 
through interventions that automatically defaulted clients into depositing into the account.   
  Through continued experimentation in this and other settings, we can learn more about 
how savings product design can help individuals fulfill their savings plans, whether savings 
product designs alter savings plans, and how these impacts on household decision making affect 
the efficacy of different savings products.  The results here suggest that design features appeal to 
those with self-control, and have a positive impact on spousal control.  These are not 
contradictory findings, but rather point out that a simple design feature such as a restriction on 
withdrawals can benefit both those in search of self control devices as well as those who desire to 






                                                 
19 One woman who was not able to reach her goal complained that her “husband would not let her save; he 
said they needed to be able to get the money.”  Another woman said she “always fought with [her] husband 
about not being able to withdraw the money in an emergency.”  Similarly, a lab experiment conducted with 
clients of the Green Bank in the Philippines finds that married men will act strategically and shield 
experimental money from their wives when possible, especially when their wife is the primary decision-
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Control Treatment Marketing F statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 3,125 803 1,553 769
Completed baseline survey 1,776 469 842 465
Completed follow-up survey 1,629 428 771 430
Baseline
Female, proportion 0.595 0.624 0.601 0.558 0.136
Married, proportion 0.773 0.806 0.767 0.753 0.151
Household decision making power index 1 1.209 1.225 1.220 1.171 0.190
(0.422) (0.423) (0.416) (0.432)
Household decision making power index 2 0.004 0.024 0.019 -0.045 0.480
(0.812) (0.799) (0.808) (0.834)
Household decision making power index 1 (married female) 1.264 1.288 1.271 1.220 0.275
(0.401) (0.385) (0.399) (0.424)
Household decision making power index 2 (married female) 0.026 0.091 0.036 -0.076 0.167
(0.799) (0.739) (0.803) (0.856)
Total savings at Green Bank, MIS 509.974 536.489 504.440 493.505 0.423
(506.408) (515.373) (500.692) (507.773)
Total household savings 5428.758 5894.524 5764.304 4363.517 0.262
(15781.820) (16279.700) (18305.750) (8852.169)
Total household informal savings 967.125 968.960 1078.983 764.733 0.531
(4641.664) (5697.623) (4988.806) (2171.288)
Savings in shared accounts (client is not the principal user) 211.739 335.801 202.528 104.767 0.475
(2784.990) (3533.014) (2885.735) (1426.876)
Formal savings of other household members 1212.963 1143.356 1445.227 865.791 0.415
(7365.828) (7212.905) (8639.445) (4462.855)
Followup
Household decision making power index 1 1.103 1.090 1.117 1.093 0.270
(0.286) (0.289) (0.285) (0.282)
Household decision making power index 2 -0.001 -0.048 0.040 -0.027 0.203
(0.775) (0.799) (0.766) (0.763)
Household decision making power index 1 (married female) 1.168 1.140 1.193 1.152 0.068
(0.273) (0.266) (0.270) (0.284)
Household decision making power index 2 (marriedd female) 0.079 -0.003 0.159 0.017 0.036
(0.779) (0.773) (0.771) (0.789)
Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. Household decision making power indices are composed from answers to "Who decides"
on the following 9 domains: what to buy at the market, expensive purchases, giving assistance to family members, family purchases,
recreational use of the money, personal use of the money, number of children, schooling of children, and use of family planning. The value for
each item takes zero if the decision making is done by spouse, one if the decision making is done by the couple, and two if decision making is
done by the respondent. Index 1 is the equally-weighted mean of an individual's responses across the nine decision categories; index 2 is the
first factor of an individual's responses across the nine categories. The factor index (2) is created only for those who have no missing response
to the nine questions on household decision making power, and thus removes all individuals without children. Analytical results throughout do
not change if index 1 is calculated with the same sample restriction as index 2.
Level Change Level Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All
Treatment 0.029 0.040 0.107** 0.124*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.053) (0.064)
Marketing 0.012 0.052 0.054 0.102
(0.021) (0.033) (0.061) (0.076)
Constant 0.778*** -0.138*** -0.061 -0.080
(0.028) (0.021) (0.043) (0.050)
Observations 1184 1184 1114 1114
R-squared 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.00
Panel B: Female
Treatment 0.056** 0.073** 0.198*** 0.241***
(0.023) (0.034) (0.069) (0.080)
Marketing 0.023 0.071* 0.087 0.192*
(0.027) (0.042) (0.085) (0.103)
Constant 0.793*** -0.147*** -0.032 -0.090
(0.040) (0.025) (0.054) (0.060)
Observations 643 643 600 600
R-squared 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.01
Panel C: Male
Treatment 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.019
(0.029) (0.047) (0.083) (0.103)
Marketing 0.018 0.030 0.041 0.012
(0.032) (0.052) (0.091) (0.115)
Constant 0.791*** -0.125*** -0.105 -0.068
(0.039) (0.037) (0.069) (0.084)
Observations 541 541 514 514
R-squared 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Dependent Variable: Index of household decision making power on what to buy at the market,
expensive purchases, giving assistance to family members, family purchases, recreational use of the
money, personal use of the money, number of children, schooling of children, and use of family
planning. The value for each item takes zero if the decision making is done by spouse, one if the
decision making is done by the couple, and two if decision making is done by the respondent. See
notes under Table 1 for the exact definition of each index. Regressions in columns (1) and (3) control
for the household decision making power in the baseline (August 2003).
Table 2: Impact on the Aggregate Household Decision-making power
Index 1 (mean) Index 2 (factor)
Sample: Individuals who have children and whose spouses/partners live in the same household
f
Table 2b: Impact on Aggregate Household Decision-making Power, by gender
Sample: Individuals who have children and whose spouses/partners live in the same household
Female Male
Index 1 (mean) Index 2 (factor) Index 1 (mean) Index 2 (factor)
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Household decision making power below median in baseline
Treatment 0.089*** 0.094** 0.291*** 0.341*** 0.018 0.021 0.041 0.025
(0.032) (0.039) (0.097) (0.102) (0.036) (0.047) (0.102) (0.115)
Marketing 0.023 0.061 0.123 0.223* 0.051 0.075 0.133 0.132
(0.040) (0.050) (0.117) (0.131) (0.040) (0.051) (0.117) (0.128)
Constant 0.800*** 0.075** -0.124 0.233*** 0.751*** 0.105*** -0.128 0.296***
(0.068) (0.030) (0.090) (0.080) (0.056) (0.037) (0.101) (0.095)
Observations 322 322 303 303 296 296 284 284
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00
Panel B: Household decision making power above median in baseline
Treatment 0.026 0.022 0.111 0.109 -0.027 0.015 -0.061 -0.004
(0.032) (0.037) (0.098) (0.103) (0.049) (0.058) (0.137) (0.149)
Marketing 0.027 0.019 0.068 0.045 -0.030 0.027 -0.092 -0.027
(0.037) (0.048) (0.120) (0.137) (0.053) (0.062) (0.145) (0.157)
Constant 0.879*** -0.342*** 0.115 -0.380*** 0.954*** -0.440*** 0.123 -0.579***
(0.103) (0.027) (0.096) (0.078) (0.137) (0.047) (0.139) (0.122)
Observations 321 321 297 297 245 245 230 230
R-squared 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent
Variable: Index of household decision making power on what to buy at the market, expensive purchases, giving
assistance to family members, family purchases, recreational use of the money, personal use of the money, number o
children, schooling of children, and use of family planning. The value for each item takes zero if the decision making is
done by spouse, one if the decision making is done by the couple, and two if decision making is done by the respondent.
See notes under Table 1 for the exact definition of each index. Regressions in columns (1) and (3) control for the
household decision making power in the baseline (August 2003).
Table 3: Impact on household decision makring
Sample: Women whose spouses/partners are living in the same house
Dependent Variable:

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Female
Treatment -0.004 0.203* 0.217* 0.023 0.143 0.013 0.112 0.174 0.162
(0.117) (0.109) (0.114) (0.110) (0.113) (0.118) (0.107) (0.111) (0.125)
Marketing -0.026 0.060 0.139 -0.117 0.046 -0.124 0.062 0.115 0.220
(0.134) (0.128) (0.137) (0.131) (0.125) (0.137) (0.120) (0.138) (0.151)
Constant
Observations 641 642 639 641 642 643 642 641 609
R-squared
Panel B: Females with household decision making power below median in baseline
Treatment -0.005 0.409** 0.175 0.010 0.323** 0.243 0.229 0.237 -0.065
(0.162) (0.162) (0.164) (0.162) (0.158) (0.167) (0.152) (0.164) (0.199)
Marketing -0.154 0.148 0.165 -0.192 0.316* -0.238 0.282* 0.150 -0.123
(0.182) (0.181) (0.182) (0.187) (0.174) (0.183) (0.171) (0.191) (0.228)
Constant
Observations 320 321 321 321 321 322 321 320 306
R-squared
Panel C: Females with household decision making power above median in baseline
Treatment 0.005 0.037 0.297* 0.033 -0.002 -0.222 0.022 0.136 0.328*
(0.171) (0.148) (0.159) (0.151) (0.160) (0.170) (0.152) (0.155) (0.168)
Marketing 0.169 0.020 0.178 -0.048 -0.174 0.130 -0.143 0.127 0.509**
(0.205) (0.184) (0.207) (0.186) (0.179) (0.213) (0.169) (0.197) (0.210)
Constant
` Observations 321 321 318 320 321 321 321 321 303
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions in this table control for the initial household 
decision making power in the baseline.  The value for each item takes zero if the decision making is done by husband, one if the decision making is done by the 
couple, and two if decision making is done by wife. 
Table 4: Impact on consumer durables
Sample Framework: Those whose spouses are living in the same house
House repair Female-oriented durables Other durables
Binary Cost Binary Total number Cost Binary Total number Cost
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All 
Treatment 0.007 172.201 -0.019 0.009 48.293 -0.015 -0.006 -2,293.060
(0.033) (1,611.810) (0.032) (0.062) (312.882) (0.030) (0.042) (1,529.312)
Marketing 0.018 -1,393.116 -0.035 -0.017 144.558 -0.011 -0.024 -2,493.613
(0.038) (1,648.315) (0.036) (0.072) (475.376) (0.034) (0.047) (1,543.340)
Constant 7,615.907*** 0.495*** 1,997.997*** 0.305*** 6,095.462***
(1,299.894) (0.047) (242.252) (0.034) (1,344.654)
Observations 1181 1181 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Females
Treatment 0.026 2,758.632 -0.023 0.086 504.622 -0.002 0.050 -2,146.550
(0.045) (1,960.731) (0.043) (0.086) (433.285) (0.040) (0.052) (2,340.491)
Marketing 0.020 -1,133.261 -0.023 0.038 -56.553 0.029 0.043 -1,731.438
(0.053) (1,875.305) (0.051) (0.104) (508.971) (0.048) (0.058) (2,401.692)
Constant 6,761.989*** 0.489*** 1,947.878*** 0.261*** 6,230.154***
(1,289.453) (0.060) (297.011) (0.036) (2,032.658)
Observations 641 641 642 642 642 642 642 642
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Males
Treatment -0.016 -3,137.328 -0.012 -0.086 -519.682 -0.032 -0.080 -2,453.800
(0.051) (2,759.733) (0.049) (0.090) (456.142) (0.044) (0.071) (1,739.883)
Marketing 0.016 -2,010.130 -0.043 -0.071 315.665 -0.055 -0.107 -3,165.144*
(0.056) (2,942.709) (0.052) (0.103) (805.930) (0.047) (0.077) (1,764.869)
Constant 8,796.324*** 0.504*** 2,066.774*** 0.365*** 5,910.628***
(2,534.068) (0.077) (406.126) (0.062) (1,555.118)
Observations 540 540 541 541 541 541 541 541
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Female-oriented durables consist of washing
machines, sewing machines, electric iron, kitchen appliances, air conditioners, fans, and stoves. Other durables include vehicles, motorcycles, and
entertainment items (i.e. CD players, TV, and radio ).
Table 5: Impact on consumer durables
Sample Framework: Those whose spouses are living in the same house
House repair Female-Oriented Durables Other Durables
Binary Cost Total number Cost Total number Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Females with household decision-making power below median in baseline
Treatment -0.027 2,480.870 0.192* 1,456.938** 0.006 -3,887.597
(0.063) (2,133.872) (0.108) (654.295) (0.073) (4,109.914)
Marketing 0.081 -1,149.406 0.126 600.512 0.052 -4,446.125
(0.075) (1,676.488) (0.142) (786.664) (0.088) (3,691.585)
Constant 5,206.818*** 0.386*** 1,518.750*** 0.273*** 8,037.500**
(1,276.748) (0.069) (359.206) (0.058) (3,550.889)
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Panel B: Females with household decision-making power above median in baseline
Treatment 0.080 3,247.131 -0.008 -403.082 0.092 -623.256
(0.063) (3,231.059) (0.131) (552.084) (0.075) (2,436.893)
Marketing -0.048 -625.615 -0.036 -702.348 0.029 926.486
(0.077) (3,433.478) (0.148) (586.010) (0.077) (3,346.618)
Constant 8,130.540*** 0.580*** 2,325.510*** 0.250*** 4,639.690**
(2,145.179) (0.094) (458.549) (0.046) (2,202.953)
Observations 319 319 320 320 320 320
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Males with household decision-making power below median in baseline
Treatment -0.006 -4,114.137 -0.080 -741.921 -0.092 -2,878.840
(0.066) (4,284.529) (0.122) (619.640) (0.103) (2,561.748)
Marketing -0.052 -3,657.542 0.014 841.101 -0.212** -4,822.457**
(0.072) (4,618.274) (0.148) (1,316.247) (0.102) (2,415.286)
Constant 9,718.987** 0.468*** 2,072.152*** 0.405*** 6,301.975***
(4,083.798) (0.105) (569.847) (0.089) (2,352.200)
Observations 296 296 296 296 296 296
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Panel D: Males with household decision-making power above median in baseline
Treatment -0.030 -1,795.457 -0.100 -259.666 -0.058 -1,881.499
(0.079) (2,829.019) (0.132) (666.850) (0.094) (2,182.161)
Marketing 0.093 104.123 -0.177 -288.920 0.023 -1,172.725
(0.087) (2,980.016) (0.143) (836.159) (0.114) (2,466.193)
Constant 7,517.544*** 0.552*** 2,059.448*** 0.310*** 5,377.586***
(2,156.450) (0.113) (568.124) (0.082) (1,813.668)
Observations 244 244 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Female-
oriented durables consist of washing machines, sewing machines, electric iron, kitchen appliances, air conditioners,








































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All
Treatment -32.050 -32.050 173.052 635.630 110.023 -133.274 435.145
(30.751) (30.751) (247.068) (1,528.336) (328.798) (199.891) (357.412)
Marketing -42.985 -42.985 70.831 431.497 -204.228 -231.034 -46.531
(34.923) (34.923) (166.457) (2,065.756) (294.566) (184.071) (279.866)
Post 89.641 119.535 30.595 -1,176.211 -351.105 -65.708 1,201.090
(137.254) (200.089) (240.080) (1,437.881) (310.218) (238.216) (829.897)
Treatment x Post 388.493 173.294 -94.696 -765.850 139.738 -109.907 -957.661
(266.817) (318.289) (401.401) (1,841.086) (428.022) (260.317) (912.670)
Marketing x Post 117.250 -150.320 -264.563 -1,962.504 -0.744 -8.594 -417.709
(170.061) (216.754) (271.056) (2,251.314) (333.927) (249.134) (1,023.733)
Constant 536.490*** 536.490*** 624.495*** 7,070.735*** 968.960*** 335.801** 807.554***
(24.905) (24.905) (134.985) (1,203.571) (275.337) (170.732) (202.638)
Number of individuals 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629
Observations 3258 3258 3258 3258 3258 3258 3258
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Female
Treatment -25.140 -25.140 15.652 93.610 333.530 -0.739 130.177
(42.067) (42.067) (311.576) (2,138.988) (362.452) (281.494) (418.242)
Marketing -65.062 -65.062 52.655 -3,559.278* 7.018 -243.932 -134.758
(48.589) (48.589) (258.876) (1,906.222) (281.287) (230.890) (404.348)
Post 167.794 -132.264 -298.934 -1,864.689 -290.655 79.689 1,852.497
(214.898) (134.907) (249.230) (2,069.854) (300.078) (345.891) (1,313.925)
Treatment x Post 169.591 571.220 456.643 -321.694 -31.787 -369.644 -1,304.087
(318.075) (427.518) (526.824) (2,545.251) (516.741) (387.318) (1,390.769)
Marketing x Post 115.095 78.402 -38.491 2,047.061 -208.778 -116.981 -1,601.105
(263.380) (168.034) (304.773) (2,257.843) (349.298) (353.996) (1,432.346)
Constant 552.541*** 552.541*** 717.713*** 8,135.578*** 916.749*** 323.307 927.091***
(33.739) (33.739) (212.253) (1,795.772) (230.258) (222.198) (279.155)
Number of individuals 970 970 970 970 970 970 970
Observations 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Male
Treatment -39.948 -39.948 424.126 1,615.619 -234.063 -334.444 912.131
(43.152) (43.152) (395.048) (1,966.478) (645.267) (265.908) (632.975)
Marketing -8.754 -8.754 130.633 5,893.331 -491.699 -219.680 112.157
(48.754) (48.754) (135.411) (3,878.893) (636.629) (297.617) (361.357)
Post -39.966 537.115 577.081 -34.448 -451.354 -306.832 120.807
(77.774) (481.705) (485.369) (1,677.985) (658.678) (268.529) (329.839)
Treatment x Post 729.681 -463.950 -974.617 -1,540.336 406.961 303.099 -335.840
(458.663) (494.203) (630.813) (2,480.583) (761.178) (269.115) (737.654)
Marketing x Post 150.861 -538.749 -680.365 -7,299.324* 285.928 185.780 1,334.561
(143.885) (501.664) (517.329) (4,098.299) (678.848) (300.599) (1,196.087)
Constant 509.871*** 509.871*** 469.904*** 5,304.815*** 1,055.547* 356.522 609.317**
(35.398) (35.398) (69.251) (1,162.696) (625.386) (265.656) (275.589)
Number of individuals 659 659 659 659 659 659 659
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table reports difference-
in-difference analysis on household savings for 1629 individuals who completed the follow-up survey. Post is an indicator variable
for the post-intervention observations. Column (1) is shown in order to reconcile the results in this table with the results reported in
the earlier paper, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006). 
Table 6: SEED Impact on Household Savings
OLS
Table 7: Impact on Savings Attitude
Ordered Probit
Dependent variable:
Although my income is 
low, I'm a disciplined saver I never save
When I have a little cash, I 
spend it rather than save
I often regret spending, I 
wish I was more disciplined 
to save
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All
Treatment 0.025 -0.053 -0.104 -0.021 -0.095 -0.051 0.181*** 0.160**
(0.069) (0.080) (0.072) (0.083) (0.065) (0.077) (0.066) (0.078)
Marketing 0.057 0.073 -0.105 -0.064 -0.084 -0.105 0.070 0.102
(0.078) (0.091) (0.085) (0.098) (0.075) (0.090) (0.074) (0.088)
Time inconsistent, baseline -0.147 0.252* 0.109 0.043
(0.126) (0.138) (0.115) (0.120)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.300* -0.303* -0.163 0.082
(0.156) (0.165) (0.146) (0.149)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline -0.050 -0.152 0.064 -0.102
(0.175) (0.195) (0.161) (0.161)
Observations 1629 1626 1629 1626 1629 1626 1629 1626
Panel B: Female
Treatment -0.021 -0.136 -0.049 0.069 -0.104 -0.005 0.130 0.153
(0.088) (0.103) (0.093) (0.107) (0.081) (0.097) (0.084) (0.101)
Marketing 0.176* 0.160 -0.148 -0.082 -0.214** -0.209* 0.118 0.184
(0.103) (0.123) (0.112) (0.132) (0.099) (0.123) (0.096) (0.118)
Time inconsistent, baseline -0.310** 0.308* 0.216 0.069
(0.158) (0.173) (0.136) (0.140)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.395** -0.389* -0.339* -0.072
(0.196) (0.209) (0.180) (0.180)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.040 -0.209 -0.018 -0.216
(0.225) (0.246) (0.199) (0.203)
Observations 970 968 970 968 970 968 970 968
Panel C: Male
Treatment 0.105 0.065 -0.199* -0.155 -0.084 -0.123 0.257** 0.170
(0.112) (0.128) (0.116) (0.133) (0.110) (0.126) (0.109) (0.121)
Marketing -0.066 -0.007 -0.077 -0.066 0.073 -0.000 0.010 -0.001
(0.118) (0.135) (0.131) (0.148) (0.118) (0.134) (0.117) (0.134)
Time inconsistent, baseline 0.128 0.196 -0.118 -0.014
(0.213) (0.222) (0.212) (0.241)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.133 -0.200 0.168 0.344
(0.263) (0.266) (0.255) (0.277)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline -0.249 -0.080 0.285 0.066
(0.283) (0.312) (0.279) (0.288)
Observations 659 658 659 658 659 658 659 658
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variables are categorical, indicating how strongly
the respondent agrees to each statement. The variable equals one if the respondent strongly disagree, two if somewhat disagree, three if neutral, four if somewhat agree,
and five if strongly agree.
Appendix Table 1: Qualitative Feedback from SEED Account Holders
Those that did not withdraw: Reason for not withdrawing Frequency
Argued with spouse 1
Bad bank service/bank is far 3
Could not save 43
Damaged passbook 1
Destroyed ganansiya box 2
Did not need money 1
Did not like terms/low interest 3
Forgot about it 13
Inconvenience 8
Money stolen (7)/lost (1) 9
Never joined/not a member 5
Nobody collected 2
Not interested 1
Not to term 51
Rolled over 3
Total 149
Those that withdrew: Spent SEED Money on: Frequency
Fiesta 7
Children's schooling 6
Other/did not say 4
Add to capital of business/sari-sar 2
Birthday (own, child, grandchild, missus, etc) 5
Child is giving birth 1
Children's graduation 2
Christmas 3
Contruction of house/repair of kitchen 2
Everyday needs/necessities/groceries 4
Medical treatment 2
Reached time goal (3 months) 1
Refrigerator 1
Supplement mothers budget 2
Total 42
Spent money on original goal 26
Spent money on different goal from original 14
